This paper is related to a study commissioned by the IADB, which will to cover the European experience with governance in regional integration, with a focus on: 1) global governance and the constitutional process and 2) the problem of the management deficit in regional integration.
areas. Furthermore they have not developed a set of once and forever valid solutions. While the treaties of Paris (1951) and Rome (1957) which form the basis of the institutional setting have been reformed -Single European Act (1986) , Treaties of Maastricht (1992) Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001) , Constitution for Europe (2004) -mainly in order to democratise these institutions and to extend the scope of common actions, a number of issues which are not settled by the treaties, but depend upon internal arrangements within and between the common institutions and management practices in the European Commission and European agencies, are to be constantly scrutinised and reviewed.
The EU is not only a success story, it is also a story of a number missed opportunities and of numerous gaps as well as of muddling through as much as successful planning and implementation. Addressing both successes and failures in European integration is far more valuable than only explaining what has been set up and how it works.
Understanding the reasons of the choices that have been made, but even more the conditions and environment in which this new regime of regional governance has been set up, is indispensable in order to asses to what extent European experiences may or may not be relevant to other attempts at regional integration (Section 1). European states have hence developed an unprecedented method for regional integration, based both on practical experience and on conceptual choices: the 'Community method'. Analysing as well the organisational settings as the conceptual foundations of this Community method should help understanding to what extent it might be transposed in other regional settings and furthermore, to what extent it is possible to take only some elements of the Community setting while keeping the coherence that is probably at the roots of its success (Section 2). Focusing on the organisational and legal framework set up at the supranational level, is however misleading, as it neglects a very important part of the issues and solutions that have to be taken into account in order to make regional integration work. As a matter of fact, examining the organisational settings and procedures which have been established within the EU member states is as important as studying the supranational framework. This allows to understand both successes and failures in European regional integration, because regional integration can only be understood as a set of multilevel issues and solutions (Section 3). European regional integration is not only a set of success stories, and should not be looked at with the idea of merely transposing best practices. With enlargement and the adoption of a new 'Constitutional basis' in 2004, the EU faces a growing number of challenges, some of which are not new, though increasing, some of which are on the other hand unprecedented. Here also, understanding the key issues in the governance of present day EU might be relevant to other regional settings, both by pointing out the specific character of these issues and by showing which methods are being used in order to try and address these challenges (Section 4).
Regional Integration as a Dynamic Process
The European Union (EU), as it is called since the treaty of Maastricht (signed in 1992) and the European Community (EC) -which is the politically speaking the same organisation while it differs from the EU in legal terms, and which was called the European Economic Community (EEC) before 1992 -has never been stable (in the medium term) in the sense that the number of states involved have increased from 6 to 25 while the scope of common actions has been very much developed and diversified. The basic elements of the institutional setting however had been settled since the beginning, i.e. since the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. In this sense the European experience demonstrates how flexible regional integration can be, and how flexibility is a condition of success, if -and only if -a number of basic features have been designed in order to cope with this flexibility.
The main feature of the evolution of the ECSC/EEC/EC/EU system is that it has been constantly growing. It is true however that it remained stable in its membership from 1951 to 1972, i.e. in the founding years which enabled to go through the whole of the foreseen transition periods. This stability however was not planned, it had been due first to the hesitations of Great Britain who did not want to join the experience before some results had been achieved, and later to the opposition of France to British participation from 1962 to 1969, due mainly to the positions the French President, General De Gaulle. He feared that British participation might endanger the French leadership in the process of integration, and he considered that the United Kingdom's ties with the United States of America as well as its traditional openness to world trade might tend to water down the project of continuing economic and political integration into a mere free trade zone that would tend to include the entire Commonwealth and maybe the USA.
This was expressed by the idea that European integration had to be deepened before the EEC could be enlarged. It is a view that keeps being repeated over time, but since the early seventies -i.e. since the end of the transition phase of 12 years which had been foreseen for setting up the common market which was at the heart of the EEC -both deepening and enlargement have been pursued successfully. According to circumstances it might seem that the priority was at certain times put upon deepening (1973 Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, 1981 Greece, 1995 . As a matter of fact, both processes have really been going hand in hand, to the extent that 1986 was both the year of enlargement to Portugal and Spain, and of the adoption of the Single European Act which paved the way for the finalisation of the internal market on 1 January 1993 January , and 2003 January -2004 the years of enlargement to ten new member states and drafting the Constitution for Europe.
For the sake of clarity, it is worthwhile to examine separately the progressive enlargement of the EU and the deepening of integration, but without ever forgetting the fact that there was no contradiction between these two processes. Contrary to what has been feared from time to time, enlargement has never led to a reduction of the scope of common actions. Two techniques have helped in this.
-First, each enlargement has been accomplished with transition periods. While participation in the institutional setting is always complete from the day of accession of a new member state, the constraints and advantages linked to common policies are being implemented progressively, as had been done by the founding member states, who had foreseen a transition period of 12 years between the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome (1 January 1958) and the full opening of borders for the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital (1 January 1970 -the customs union having been achieved on 1 July 1968, i.e. one and a half year ahead of the deadline that had been put in the treaty.
-Second, while the principle is that a new member state cannot select, and has to accede to the entire acquis -i.e. all the treaty clauses, the policies that have been established and the legislation that has been adopted before its accession -there has always been flexibility in order to accommodate specific concerns. Transition periods have been different from one member state to another, from one policy field to another. For instance, the transition for the application of full freedom of circulation of labourers to Portugal was not the same as for Spain, whereas they both became members of the European Community on the same day. This has to be understood in the light of both the presence of about a million of Portuguese in France even before Portugal joined the EC, and of the fact that Portuguese decolonisation in Africa would probably bring an important number of immigrants to the European part of Portugal. In some cases, exemptions have also been foreseen. The main exemptions to signal have been the 'social protocol' adopted together with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, in which the United Kingdom did not want to participate, the non-participation (at least in a first period) of Denmark, the UK and Sweden in the monetary union, and the non participation of Ireland and the UK in the Schengen system, which allows for the suppression of border controls on persons within the EU.
I has to be stressed once again that transition periods and exemptions only apply to policies and rules of integration, not to the institutional setting. The only important exception to this principle is the European Central Bank and the System of European Central Banks: only member states who participate in the European Monetary Union (EMU) (which is embedded in the European Community) are participating in these institutions. As an example which confirms the rule, one may quote the fact that all member states participate in meetings of the Council of ministers that examine the performance of the members of the EMU who are bound by very strict rules applying to their economic and budgetary policies.
The characteristics of countries involved in enlargement (see table 1) are very different in terms of size (both population and territory) and wealth, but also in terms of language and culture. The latter element makes for an obvious difference (at first sight) between LatinAmerica and Europe, but differences in demographic, geographic and economic terms might lead to interesting comparisons. However, there is no equivalent in Europe of the asymmetries which are to be found in terms of size of territory and population, as well as economic structure between Brazil on one side, and Spanish speaking countries on the other. The striking element in the history of European integration is that each successive enlargement -with the sole exception of the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 -has deepened the heterogeneity of EU membership. One central question in 2004 is whether the last enlargement, to 10 new member states, presents a genuinely new challenge or just a repetition of past experiences, in terms of overall numbers of member states, but even much more, due to the fact that eight out of them were integrated into the soviet sphere of influence and had a centralised plan economy during forty years. Clearly only time will tell. The issue of a possible accession of Turkey in the two thousand tens or twenties presents the same type of question mark, with a far bigger weight on the cultural side. The fields covered by integration have also been increasingly differentiated and varied. The scope of integration was limited to one specific market -coal and steel -during the first years of the experience , and then extended to all aspects of market economy. It included as well establishing a free trade area, a customs union and a common market (negative integration) as a growing number of common policies (positive integration). These policies started as "accompanying policies" aimed at correcting market failures or at protecting specific economic interests, but since 1992 (treaty of Maastricht) and even more since 1997 (treaty of Amsterdam) they include areas that have no link with economic issues (area of security, liberty and justice).
One might argue that this was already earlier the case with foreign policy, or conversely that the latter is not solid enough to be understood as a real area of integration. It is often said that integration started with areas that were not sensitive to claims on sovereignty (economic) and only recently extending to the core functions of sovereign states (money, police, foreign affairs, defence). This view may easily be contended: a customs union touches also upon one of the hard core sovereignty issues, and it had been foreseen in the Treaty of Rome, which entered into force on 1 January 1958. Quite remarkably, the transition period eventually was shorter by 18 months to the period which had been foreseen initially. More than insistence on sovereignty v. low politics, the EU experience shows that agreement on integration has been easier -from 1958 onwards -in those fields where there were either no significant oppositions of interests between member states, or when it was sufficiently clear that integration would result in a positive sum game. This match between the nature of interests at stake, the diversity of participating country, and the institutional and legal setting is quite remarkable on the whole in the European experience, and certainly much more relevant to other experiences of regional integration than the specific elements of policies and governance.
Last but not least, an almost constant feature or European integration has been and remains the lack of agreement between countries involved on the finalité of integration. In the French language finalité is mainly understood as meaning what is it's use, whereas in the English language it point to the ultimate stage to be reached by European integration: a Federal state, a confederation or an international organisation, and to it's ultimate boarders: should Turkey or even Russia be included, etc. The second set of issues has never been answered, because since the mid fifties there were divergences upon the answer between member states. The French pragmatic conception of finalité has always predominated, because the approach of some countries to these issues has been changing overtime (France, Spain or even the UK are typical examples). This is due to the fact that public opinion and political elites are often quite divided upon these issues within a growing number of member states, and finally because most actors in integration tend to think that time passing, their option will reveal itself as the only realistic one.
This feature of European integration is fundamental for its relevance to other experiences, far more than understanding the implications of neo-functionalist theory, which may has a good expost explicative value, but does not present ready made solutions for new experiences. However, the lack of agreement upon the finalité should not be exaggerated: once the United Kingdom decided to join the European Communities and to leave the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) that it had set up as an alternative with a number of European countries not participating in the Communities, the core agreement common to all Member States is that the EC/EU is more than a free trade agreement and customs union, and that it necessarily has some kind of political dimension.
European integration is a dynamic process, which has always be expanding until now. In terms of governance, the issue to be examined is whether and how the institutional and legal settings and their implementation have been adapted to this dynamism, to what extent they have been fostering dynamism or impeding it. There is no clear-cut answer to this question. As far as legal instruments are concerned it may be quite easily demonstrated that the choice of normative instruments (regulation, directive, decision etc.) and especially the instrument of the directive, have been adapted to this dynamism. This goes together with an appropriate judicial system, the major feature of which are on one side the possibility for the Commission to go to Court independently, and the possibility for national courts to address questions for preliminary rulings.
The latter are essential to the functioning of the network of European and national courts, and have been most effective due to the techniques used by the European Court of Justice, which draws upon a big number of different member states' experiences in judge made law. For the Institutional setting, the advantages of an independent Commission with a monopoly on formal policy initiative, as well as the flexibility of majority voting in the Council -when availableare also common knowledge. A far more intense discussion in view of the possibility to transpose this setting to other regional experiences is however still lacking to my view.
The "Community Method" as The European Solution to Regional Integration
Article I-1 of the Constitution for Europe states: "Establishment of the Union "1. Reflecting the will of the citizens and States of Europe to build a common future, this Constitution establishes the European Union, on which the Member States confer competences to attain objectives they have in common. The Union shall coordinate the policies by which the Member States aim to achieve these objectives, and shall exercise on a Community basis the competences they confer on it. The draft which was adopted by the European Convention in June 2003 used the expression "in the Community way" instead of "on a Community basis". This was an attempt to mirror the French expression "sur le mode communautaire" proposed by the Convention's President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. 'Community method' was the usual expression until the European Convention. At any rate both expressions are telling for more than "on a Community basis", and it is most useful using them in order to describe the genuinely European solution to Regional Integration as developed since the early nineteen fifties. The Community method is made out of four elements, which are inseparable in order to understand the achievements of the EEC/EC/EU.
1.
Pooling of sovereignties/powers/competences is the first response to the issues of trying to work together at a regional level. The European Coal and Steel Community, established in 1951, was base on pooling together natural resources (coal and steel) which were considered at the time as the major resources for industrial development. Pooling meant that in theory each country remained the owner of its own resources, but that they established a management mechanism involving the six governments, albeit separate from them, in order to regulate the very specific coal and steel market. This very tangible type of pooling was later on extended to the far more defuse elements which were considered as the basis of market economy as well on the side of outputs (goods and services) as inputs (labour and capital), with the same idea of a shared mechanism in order to set up the common market, by abolishing barriers to movement of inputs and outputs, and a system for managing the common market. Pooling sovereignties is a rather abstract concept, derived from the more substantial idea of pooling resources. It has an important symbolic value, because it implies that sovereignty is not lost, but simply shared, and thus nationstates remain while cooperating together. 
4.
The last element of the Community method is that integration is achieved through law as a prominent tool. Without going into details three elements have to be pointed at as being the major features of the EC system in this respect. The first is that a specific series of legal instruments -different from classical international agreements -have been designed in order to try and combine homogeneity or rules throughout the EC with flexibility in their detailed implementation when necessary. Whether this has always been achieved may be discussed, but there are enough sectors where it may be rather easily demonstrated. The second element is the existence of an independent court at European level which is not only accessible to governments if they wish so -as in the classical setting of international relations -but which is also accessible to non governmental actors: the Commission as a representative of the common regional interest, and the economic actors or even individuals who are the final addressees of common rules and decisions. The third and probably most important element of the EC legal system is based both upon a specific tool established by the EEC treaty -the possibility for any national court to have a "dialogue" with the ECJ through the mechanism of preliminary rulings -and the case-law of the ECJ which, through the principles of direct effect and primacy, has enabled the national courts to be the real warrants of the respect of EC law by member states' governments. In view of other experiences of regional integration -including NAFTA -it seems that this highly important feature might be one of the most difficult to reproduce. Its success is indeed based upon a highly developed system of independent courts and very expert legal profession and also upon a series of specific elements of judicial procedures within member states, which have taken a very long time to establish. In practice, the legal culture of most member States of the European Union -be it based on English type common law, on French type codified civil law and judge made administrative law or on German-Italian type codified civil law and partly judge made constitutional law (Spain, for instance being influenced by both) -is far less formalistic than it is perceived by non-specialists, and probably far closer to Canadian and US-legal cultures than to those of Latin America.
Regional Integration as a "Multilevel" Issue
Political science literature, and more recently legal literature on European integration is using the expressions 'multilevel government' or 'multilevel governance' since a number of years in all possible ways, sometimes 'ad nauseam'. While dispute on definitions and concepts might go on indefinitely in this field, the concept 'multilevel' is indeed relating to a very important reality, well known as well to academics as to a number of practitioners, but often overlooked by those in charge of designing systems of governance of regional integration and of making it work. This is specially true in the case of institutional reform in the EC/EU dynamic process, for the simple reason that attention almost always focuses on the international treaties which are the legal tool for the common framework. This easily results in the idea -that is shared by a number of politicians and practitioners at both supranational level and national (or even sub-national) level -that in order to progress on governance issues in European integration, it is not only necessary to concentrate on European institutions and procedures -this is not to be disputed -but also that it is sufficient to do so, while as a matter of fact both the common European institutions and procedures and those of the member states have to be taken into account and reformed if needed.
Taking seriously the idea of a multilevel governance means that at least three aspects have to be considered. The European experience is not very satisfactory in this respect: indeed, a number of interesting lessons may be drawn from this unsatisfactory experience, which translate both in terms of institutional design (understood as the establishment of institutions and procedures) and in terms of training of the relevant actors.
As a first aspect, experience in the EC/EU as a whole as well as at Member States' level shows that the never-ending adaptations of the system of governance, that are necessary in order to respond to the dynamism of the integration process, have to proceed both at the level of European Institutions and at Member state level. However well designed the founding treaties or the specific European sector legislation may be, they are in danger of remaining mere blueprints if the necessary adaptations are not being made in national -and sub national -governmental institutions (political institutions and public administration) in terms of organisation and procedure. Adopting the necessary national legislation is a necessary element, but not sufficient if that legislation is not implemented and enforced in due time, in good faith, and efficiently.
Amongst the many issues at stake, the link between a careful ex-ante expression of a given national position in European decision making and the smooth ex-post implementation of the relevant legislation or decision is the best illustration of this issue of multi-level government. It is common knowledge in European institutions that the British or the Danish governments, which show rather little enthusiasm towards the idea that integration and common action is necessarily better than isolated actions, are demonstrating very good performances in applying common policies, even if they do not correspond to the optimum of their wishes. This might be explained to a certain extent by a specific culture in law-obedience, but it does not account for the fact that far more euro-enthusiastic governments of countries which share the same type of culture score worse when it comes to implementation. Studies show that systems of coordination and of voicing organised interests in due time are at least as important if not more than "culture" which might be very ill-defined. This element to my view is extremely important in order to counteract hasty judgements that tend to explain that latin-american culture would not be adapted to institutions, procedures or structures which have been designed in Europe. As a matter of fact, with the increase of the number of EU member states, the diversity of national systems is providing a growing number of relevant experiences, which may be as valuable if not even more, as the experience with European institutions at supranational level.
A second aspect to take into account is the 'dark side' of the European experience which might be particularly interesting and maybe relevant, namely the bad consequences of focusing attention merely on the institutional architecture and competences of the common regional institutions : since more than two decades, European governance issues are identified by politicians and to some extent by the literature with the so-called 'democratic deficit' of the European Union. Comparing the issues at European and national level shows that if deficit there is in this respect, it would more accurate to identify it as a 'deficit in legitimacy and accountability' of the European Union, and sometimes in a 'deficit in communication'. The idea of a 'democratic deficit' of the Union disregards the multilevel issue in that legitimacy and accountability cannot be pursued only at one level -European or national -but need to be addressed at both. The European experience not only shows that there is no easy solution to these type of issues, which have been at the centre of the European Commission's "White book on
European governance", but also that any isolated attempt at solving the question by institutional engineering at the European level is deemed to fail.
A third aspect is that for a very long time, there has been a lack of focus on implementation and on member States when trying to solve governance problems in the EU/EC : some authors, like Metcalfe call this the 'management deficit' of the EU. The change has come only in the mid nineteen nineties, when the European Commission on one side started to integrate the idea that it was not sufficient to establish the legal framework for the internal market, but that the market had to be at least monitored if not regulated, and that this was demanding far more action an national level, and thus changing the nature of the work of the Commission itself. The
Commission had been designed and had functioned during decades as an institution whose main role was to draft legislation on the one side, while prosecuting those governments which did not comply with common legislation on the other. It started also acting with a different set of tools in order to ensure cooperation between different public actors -and sometimes private actors -, a far more demanding job in terms of the skills necessary for effective functioning of its agents. In the same time, the prospect of enlargement to States which did not have a fully fledged market economy forced the European Commission to take into account the effective capacity of implementation of common rules and policies and not only the formal transposition of legal rules. Both processes have been far from being conducted in a perfect way and it often still too early to assess their successes and failures, but they might be very interesting and relevant for other experiences of regional integration.
Key Issues of Contemporary European Governance and Proposed Solutions
If the three previous sections of this paper are being accepted as good premises for understanding European integration from an American regional integration perspective, it becomes useful to try and have a more detailed look at the key issues which are on the agenda of the European Union, and at the solutions which are being more or less officially proposed to solve these issues. The purpose of such an exercise would be to go beyond the usual retrospective study of European integration for the purpose of drawing lessons that might be relevant for other regions.
In general terms, it is probable that the key issues that European integration are facing now are also relevant to Latin America, i.e. :
1. Keeping an efficient and democratic system for decision making with an ever-growing number 2. This combination of boldness and realism was without any doubt the result of the leading role in the Convention of experienced politicians from several different member states, who had personal experience both in national and European institutions. They made sure that the Convention remained in touch with reality and acknowledged the limits beyond which member states government were not ready to go.
3.
Contrary to the usual intergovernmental conferences, where diplomats and experts of EC law were dominating the decision making procedure, the European Convention was composed of an great majority of experienced parliamentarians, coming both from national parliaments and from the European Parliament. This allowed to make a number of changes in the institutional setting, procedures and instruments, designed to make the EU's functioning easier to understand to citizens, who are more accustomed to the functioning of their national political institutions. The fact that the Convention's proposal included a specific system of qualified majority voting, or a permanent President for the European Council, or a Foreign Minister for the EU is probably far less relevant than the process itself, although it might attract more attention in the future Table 2 is trying to recapitulate the major key issues and proposed solutions in order to discuss their potential relevance to regional integration in America, and can therefore only be presented as extremely tentative. The discussion during the ELSNIT conference has helped in identifying those aspects of issues and solutions that might come out as relevant if further work were to be undertaken; the indications in the right hand column remain however mere hypothesis, as they would need further detailed examination in order to get clarified. The hypothesis here is based upon the elements of proposed solutions in the EU context, and not on the relevance of the issues.
If it turned out that this table were to really reflect the relevance of present day discussions about European governance, it would reinforce the need to concentrate comparative work with practical goals upon the analysis of processes as they have evolved over the last decades rather than trying to go into the details of the EU solutions to problems which, if sometimes similar to those of Latin-American countries, are embedded in a totally different context.
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